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a b s t r a c t
Action-outcome contingencies can be learnt either by active trial-and-error, or vicariously,
by observing the outcomes of actions performed by others. The extant literature is ambig-
uous as to which of these modes of learning is more effective, as controlled comparisons of
operant and observational learning are rare. Here, we contrasted human operant and
observational value learning, assessing implicit and explicit measures of learning from
positive and negative reinforcement. Compared to direct operant learning, we show obser-
vational learning is associated with an optimistic over-valuation of low-value options, a
pattern apparent both in participants’ choice preferences and their explicit post-hoc esti-
mates of value. Learning of higher value options showed no such bias. We suggest that such
a bias can be explained as a tendency for optimistic underestimation of the chance of expe-
riencing negative events, an optimism repressed when information is gathered through
direct operant learning.
 2011 Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Many instances of everyday learning rely upon
trial-and-error. Here, a decision-maker samples between
alternative actions and risks unfavorable outcomes in the
early stages of learning, when action-outcome contingen-
cies are unknown. Learning can also occur through observ-
ing the successes and failures of others, enabling us to
acquire knowledge vicariously. Indeed, the beneﬁts of
observational learning are ubiquitous in nature. For exam-
ple, a hungry animal can avoid the energy costs incurred in
active sampling of optimal feeding locations by observing
actions and outcomes of conspeciﬁcs. A proliferation of
customer review websites epitomizes the utility of learn-
ing through the positive and negative experiences of others
so obviating our own need for expensive decisions. In this
way, observational learning is recognized as supporting
‘‘locally adaptive behaviors without incurring the costs
associated with individual learning’’ (Boyd & Richerson,
1988, p. 30).
Surprisingly, the efﬁcacy of observational learning has
been rarely studied in the context of human value learning.
Empirical evidence in animals attests to the fact that re-
warded behavior is promoted, and punished behavior
diminished, in passive observers (e.g. Bandura, 1971; Daw-
son & Foss, 1965; Heyes & Dawson, 1990; Mineka & Cook,
1988; Weigl & Hanson, 1980). For example, budgerigars
show imitation of rewarded behaviors but a diminution
of such behavior if the observed consequences are not sali-
ent, suggesting that vicariously conditioned responses are
goal-directed and not a mere mimicry of an observed
action (Heyes, 1994; Heyes & Saggerson, 2002). However,
despite these data, evidence for the effectiveness of obser-
vational learning is inconsistent. Church (1959) found that
rats observing lights predicting a shock to a model do
not generalize these contingencies to their own risk
preferences.
Several critical differences can be highlighted between
vicarious and active value learning, which may lead to dif-
ferences in information acquisition. One factor is motiva-
tion, of key importance in Bandura’s (1977) social
learning theory, given that passive observers do not di-
rectly incur costs or beneﬁts during learning. Our emo-
tional responses, enhanced when we act and experience
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A. Nicolle et al. / Cognition 119 (2011) 394–402 395outcomes ourselves, motivate our learning and decision-
making (e.g. Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Anticipated emotions
may also increase attention and an incentive to learn, and
are likely to be greatest when actively learning. Alterna-
tively, our emotions can potentially distract from, or
‘‘crowd out’’, our goals (Loewenstein, 1996), or bias our
memory for the frequency of past events (cf. emotional
biases of eyewitness testimonies, e.g. Loftus, 1996), both
of which could disrupt learning. Consistent with this ‘‘dark
side of emotion’’, individuals with decreased emotional re-
sponses for outcomes of risky decisions can show more
advantageous decision-making (Shiv, Loewenstein, &
Bechara, 2005).
Operant and observational learning differ in how atten-
tion is directed during learning. An actor’s ability to selec-
tively sample an environment facilitates learning of an
existing ‘region of uncertainty’ (Cohn, Atlas, & Ladner,
1994). Observers, on the other hand, lack this sampling
control, making learning potentially inefﬁcient. Observa-
tional learning may require a more explicit, declarative
acquisition of knowledge, which may not be necessary gi-
ven the procedural nature of operant learning (Howard,
Mutter, & Howard, 1992; Kelly, Burton, Riedel, & Lynch,
2003; Willlingham, 1999). Neumann (1990) has argued
that perception needs to be concurrently tied with action
to inﬂuence subsequent behavior. fMRI studies, and assess-
ments of learning deﬁcits in Parkinson’s patients, support a
functional dissociation of declarative or observational
learning from non-declarative, procedural learning (Ostl-
und & Balleine, 2007; Poldrack et al., 2001; Shohamy
et al., 2004). Furthermore, while explicit knowledge acqui-
sition may be subject to distraction by other motivations,
implicit learning of action-outcome associations may be
less vulnerable to distraction (Neumann, 1990). From these
considerations it is reasonable to predict superior learning
through action than through observation.
In this study, our aim was to make a controlled compar-
ison between active and observational learning in the con-
text of human probabilistic value learning. Thus, we
implemented a learning task where individuals learnt
either by active sampling (with associated reward and
punishment) or by passive observation. We assessed learn-
ing efﬁcacy as shown by goal-directed choices and individ-
uals’ explicit estimates of value. All aspects of the tasks,
save for the critical factor of self versus other choice, were
matched across two modes of value learning. Speciﬁcally,
differences in attention and information were controlled,
as participants could track the same sequences of out-
comes in both learning conditions, as was motivation to
learn, since participants earned money according to learn-
ing performance in both conditions.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Participants
In this ﬁrst experiment we recruited 17 healthy partic-
ipants, screened for neurological or psychological disor-
ders. Participants failing to reach a criterion of 60%
accuracy by the end of each session, when choosing be-tween the 80/20 probability of winning pair, were ex-
cluded from further analysis, given a performance level
barely exceeding chance (i.e. 50% accuracy) and was con-
sidered as a failure to engage sufﬁciently with the task.
This was the case only for one participant, leaving 16 par-
ticipants for the full analysis (nine female, mean age
23.8 yrs, SD 3.0). Participants provided informed consent,
according to UCL Research Ethics Committee approved
procedures.
2.2. Procedure
Participants completed two sessions on consecutive
days. In the ﬁrst (the ‘actor session’), participants made
choices between four stimuli (letters from Agathodaimon
font), presented in different pairs on each trial, while con-
currently attempting to learn the probability of winning
from each. Participants were made aware that each stimu-
lus was associated with a discrete and constant probability
of winning (p{win}), and outcomes of each stimulus were
drawn independently on every trial. Outcomes of chosen
and unchosen stimuli were then shown sequentially, with
yellow and red boxes indicating winning and losing out-
comes, respectively. Critically, these outcomes directly
inﬂuenced participant’s earnings for the actor session
(with £1 awarded for each chosen win from 10 randomly
selected trials). Participants were instructed to choose
the stimulus with the highest p{win} on every trial in order
to maximize earnings.
On day 2 (the ‘observer session’), participants learned
the values of a novel set of stimuli (stimulus sets were bal-
anced between sessions and across participants). We gave
an instruction that this time participants would observe
choices made previously by another participant, along
with their associated outcomes. Participants were not pro-
vided with any information about this other participant,
but were informed that these were real choices made by
a different individual in a prior session. Participants were
informed that, although they could learn from the out-
comes of observed choices, these outcomes would not
inﬂuence their own earnings for the observer session. Un-
known to them, participants observed the sequence of
choices they had made in their previous actor session,
although now with visually novel stimuli. The two sessions
were, therefore, matched in terms of the information from
which they learned. Observer sessions were completed on
day 2 in order to reduce memory for previous choice se-
quence. To match for motor responses, observers indicated
the observed choice on each trial with a button-press.
Since learning could not be measured in these observation
trials, because a free choice is not made, we introduced test
trials to assess learning in both actors and observers. These
comprised nine blocks of trials (test blocks) at regular
intervals throughout learning. Here, free choices were
made by both actors and observers in the absence of out-
come feedback (to prevent further learning).
Fig. 1 illustrates exemplar learning and test trials and
indicates the sole difference between actors and observers
at the time of choice. Participants played a total of 324
trials per session (i.e. actor or observer). There were 12
trials in each of nine learning blocks, allowing for six
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Fig. 1. Timeline for both actor session and observer session. Learning blocks (dark gray) and test blocks (light gray) alternate nine times, with rests at three
regular intervals. In learning trials, actors make a free choice between a stimulus pair, indicated by the blue box. Outcomes of the chosen and unchosen
stimulus are then displayed sequentially, with a yellow box indicating a win, and red indicating no win. In observer sessions, learning trials differ only in
participants’ response. Here, participants wait until the blue box is shown, indicating the ‘‘other participant’s’’ choice, and then press the button
corresponding to the selected stimulus. Outcomes are presented as in the actor session. In test trials, free choices between stimulus pairs are made by both
actors and observers, but outcomes are not displayed.
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blocks, each stimulus could be presented within any possi-
ble pairing (i.e. six possible pairings, each pair presented
nine times, resulting in 54 presentations overall for each
of the four stimuli). There were 24 trials in each of the nine
test blocks, allowing for 12 presentations of each stimulus.
Stimulus pairings in test blocks were restricted to those of
80/20, 80/60, 60/40 and 40/20 proportions, which allowed
for three repetitions of each pair type per test block. While
80/20 stimuli have a large discrepancy in probability,
80/60, 60/40 and 40/20 are matched. By using two levels
of probability discrepancy (i.e. not including 80/40 and
60/20 gamble pairs in test trials), we maximize power for
distinguishing an effect of discrepancy while preserving
power to examine learning effects for each choice pair.
Stimulus pairs were presented in a random order. Trial se-
quence was identical across actor and observer sessions
and all pairings had equal frequency. At the end of each
session, participants provided explicit estimates of p{win}
for each stimulus learnt through either action or observa-
tion. Here, participants were shown each stimulus in turn
and asked to explicitly write down their estimate of the
probability of winning (as a percentage of trials) for the
stimulus independent of its pairing.
In the observer session, participants were paid based on
the (hidden) outcomes of 10 choices from the test trials. In
their actor session, earnings were based on the chosen out-
comes of ﬁve test and ﬁve learning trials. This matched theoverall ﬁnancial incentives across each learning session
overall. Full payment was given after the second session,
but participants were informed that the earnings of each
session were independent. Practices for both actor and ob-
server sessions were given at the beginning of the ﬁrst
session.
2.3. Design and analysis
We measured choice accuracy for each pair, over the
nine test blocks, as the proportion of times that that option
with the highest p{win} of each pair was chosen. Analysis
was restricted to test blocks where both actors and observ-
ers made measurable free choices. We used a 2  4  9
within-subject design with factors for learning session
(A/O), gamble pair (80/20, 80/60, 60/40, 40/20) and test
block (1–9). To eliminate differences in individual learning
ability, we measured within-subject changes in choice
accuracy between the two sessions. Analyses were two-
tailed to test for both increases and decreases in learning
against the null hypothesis of no signiﬁcant change be-
tween the two learning sessions.
Reaction times (RTs) were analyzed using a 2  2  9
ANOVAwith factors comprising learning session (A/O), size
of probability discrepancy (80/20 versus 80/60, 60/40 and
40/20) and test block (1–9). We predicted an effect of prob-
ability discrepancy on RT, since 80/20 pairs were consid-
ered to allow for easier value discrimination than 80/60,
A. Nicolle et al. / Cognition 119 (2011) 394–402 39760/40 and 40/20 pairs. We also tested for an effect of ses-
sion on explicit estimates of p{win} for each stimulus,
using a 2  4 ANOVA with factors for learning session (A/
O) and stimulus (80, 60, 40, 20).
2.4. Results
A repeated-measures ANOVA showed a main effect of
the gamble pair on accuracy (F[3, 45] = 7.41, p < 0.001,
g2 = 0.33), an effect that also interacted signiﬁcantly with
session (F[3, 45] = 3.76, p < 0.02, g2 = 0.20). Post-hoc paired
t-tests showed this interaction was driven by a difference
in actor and observer accuracy for the 40/20 pair alone,
such that observers were signiﬁcantly less accurate for
these decisions (t[15] = 3.0, p < 0.01) (Fig. 2a).We also
found a quadratic effect of gamble pair in the case of actors
(F[1, 15] = 13.05, p < 0.005, g2 = 0.47), which was not pres-
ent for observers (gamble pair  session, F[1, 15] = 5.86,
p < 0.05, g2 = 0.28). This may reﬂect decreased uncertainty,
and therefore higher accuracy, when choices involve the
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Fig. 2. In (a) choice accuracy for each test trial gamble pair is shown collapsed ac
learning sessions (observer accuracy–actor accuracy) is plotted separately for eac
win for each stimulus. Choice accuracy is measured as the probability that partic
observer learning differed only for the 40/20 p{win} pair, with observers show
standard error of the mean.ability effect (see review by Erev and Barron (2005)). In
contrast, actors perform relatively poorly in the case of
the 60/40 pair, where outcome variance is highest.
We found a signiﬁcant linear effect of learning over the
nine test blocks (F[1, 15] = 15.09, p < 0.002, g2 = 0.50), such
that accuracy improved over time. This effect interacted
signiﬁcantly with gamble pair (F[1, 15] = 9.05, p < 0.01,
g2 = 0.38), with accuracy improving more steeply for 80/
20 and 80/60 pair choice, than for the two remaining pairs.
There was no interaction of session  gamble pair  test
block, suggesting that observers’ low choice accuracy for
the 40/20 pair was not modulated by time (See Fig. 2b).
The overall frequencies of choosing each stimulus over
time are presented in Fig. S1.
Since the 60% and 40% win options were presented to
participants both in the context of a better and a worse
alternative option, we additionally examined the effect of
this contextual pairing with a 2  2  2 within-subjects
ANOVA with factors for session (A/O), choice (60/40) and
context (whether the choice is the higher or lower value).











ross test block. In (b) the change in choice accuracy from actor to observer
h of the nine test blocks. Pairs are labeled according to the probability of a
ipants chose the stimulus with the highest probability of a win. Actor and
ing signiﬁcantly lower accuracy compared to actors. Error bars show the
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options were selected signiﬁcantly more when they were
the highest value option in the pair (F[1, 15] = 105.75,
p < 0.001, g2 = 0.88). Observers were signiﬁcantly less
likely to choose the 40% options when presented in a 40/
20 pairing (mean 40% under 40/20 actor = 0.88; mean
40% under 40/20 observer = 0.58; t[15] = 2.97, p < 0.01).
This effect was not signiﬁcant for the 60% option when pre-
sented in a 60/40 pairing (i.e. when 60% was the highest
value stimulus) – (mean 60% under 60/40 actor = 0.66;
mean 60% under 60/40 observer = 0.74; t[15] = 0.82, ns),
nor were there any signiﬁcant choice frequency difference
between actor and observer sessions when 60% or 40%
were the lower value stimulus in the pair (mean 60% under
80/60 actor = 0.17; mean 60% under 80/60 observer = 0.17;
mean 40% under 60/40 actor = 0.34; mean 40% under 60/40
observer = 0.26). This was reﬂected in a session  choice 
context interaction (F[1, 15] = 7.87, p < 0.02, g2 = 0.34).
These ﬁndings are therefore in keeping with an over-
valuation speciﬁc to the worst 20% win option rather than
evidence for a more generic contextual effect.
Participants’ explicit estimates of stimulus p{win}
showed a speciﬁc impairment in learning in relation to
lower p{win} options (Fig. 3). A repeated-measures ANOVA
showed a gamble  session interaction in estimates of
p{win} (F[3, 45] = 7.29, p < 0.0005, g2 = 0.33), such that
p{win} for the 20% win option was signiﬁcantly overesti-
mated through observation compared to action
(t(15) = 4.61, p < 0.005). Observers’ individual choice pref-
erence in 40/20 test choices was also strongly associated
with the degree to which the 20% win gamble was over-
valued when observing compared to acting (R2 = 0.29,
p < 0.05).
Test trial RT’s were inﬂuenced by how much a gamble
pair deviated in p{win}, such that participants were slower

















Fig. 3. Participants’ estimated probability of a win (p{win}) for each
stimulus, learned during the actor and observer sessions, plotted against
the actual p{win} for each stimulus. Observers signiﬁcantly overesti-
mated the p{win} for the 20% win stimulus, compared to actors. Error bars
show the standard error of the mean.40, 40/20, mean = 1145.65 ms, SD = 54.37 ms) compared to
an easily discriminable p{win} pair (80/20, mean =
959.67 ms, SD = 42.51 ms) (F[1, 15] = 125.81, p < 0.0001,
g2 = 0.89). There was also a linear effect of test number
with participants becoming quicker with time (F[1, 15] =
35.65, p < 0.0001, g2 = 0.70). There were no effects of ses-
sion (mean actor = 1038.63 ms, SD actor = 51.01 ms; mean
observer = 1066.69, SD observer = 49.67 ms), showing that
any difference found between observational and operant
learning was not explicable by RT differences.2.5. Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 show that, while value
learning through trial-and-error is highly accurate, obser-
vational learning is associated with erroneous learning of
low-value options (i.e. those with the lowest probability
of reward). In essence, observational learners show a strik-
ing over-estimation of the likelihood of winning from the
lower-value options, a fallacy leading to impaired accuracy
when choosing between two low-value options. This learn-
ing difference was apparent even though monetary incen-
tives and visual information were matched in actor and
observer learning. A different number of test trials were
paid for observers relative to actors and this might have
had a general effect on performance. However, it cannot
explain observers’ asymmetrically poor accuracy when
choosing between the 40/20 gamble pairs, and ﬁnancial
incentives were matched across each learning session
overall. It is important to note that over-estimation of the
value of the 20% win option did not cause observers to per-
form signiﬁcantly worse when choosing between the 80/
20 pairs. This is likely to reﬂect the fact that the probability
difference is uniquely high for such pairs, allowing for
lower uncertainty when determining the higher value
choice.
It is interesting to observe that individual choice accu-
racies do not asymptote to 100%, as might be expected
from rational decision makers once they accurately learn
the value of stimuli. This may partially reﬂect the phenom-
enon of probability matching, a common ﬁnding in learn-
ing experiments (Herrnstein, 1961; Lau & Glimcher,
2005; Sugrue, Corrado, & Newsome, 2004), arising from a
matching of choice frequency to average reinforcement
rate. Note that, in our data, choice frequencies do not sim-
ply match learnt probabilities of reward, moreover proba-
bility matching does not in itself predict any difference
between acting and observational learning.
Two potential design weaknesses can be identiﬁed in
Experiment 1. First, by yoking the sequence of actor
choices to participants’ subsequent observer session, to
match actor and observer learning for information pre-
sented, we are not able to counterbalance session order.
Since participants also learnt about novel stimuli in the
second session, learning may be worse solely because the
task has switched. To explicitly address these issues, we
designed a second study (Experiment 2) to test for changes
in learning between two actor sessions, with stimuli for
each session taken from the equivalent sessions of Experi-
ment 1. We predicted participants would show improved
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stimuli, due to generalization of learning strategy.
Secondly, in Experiment 1 it is impossible to distinguish
between over-valuation of low-value options versus over-
estimation of low probabilities. To address this, we con-
ducted an additional experiment (Experiment 3) which
reversed the framing of learning such that participants
now learn in order to avoid losing, rather than to reap a re-
ward. In so doing, options with the highest value were now
associated with the lowest probability of losing, allowing
us to explicitly dissociate probability and value.3. Experiment 2
3.1. Participants
17 new participants took part in Experiment 2. As in
Experiment 1, one participant was excluded due to a fail-
ure to reach our accuracy criterion. 16 participants re-
mained (six female, mean age 31.2 yrs, SD 10.6).
3.2. Procedure and analysis
Here participants performed two actor sessions on con-
secutive days, using the same procedure and stimuli as in
Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, novel stimuli were used
in the second session. Choice accuracy was measured as
the probability that participants chose the stimulus with
the highest probability of a win. Explicit estimates of
p{win} were also assessed after each session.
While Experiment 2 used the same design as Experi-
ment 1, critical analyses now involved the between-sub-
ject interactions in relation ﬁndings from Experiment 1.
We term Experiment 1’s participants the AO group, and
Experiment 2’s participants the AA group.
3.3. Results and Discussion
Within the AA group, we found a main effect of gamble
pair (F[3, 45] = 5.64, p < 0.005, g2 = 0.27), of test block
(F[8, 120] = 4.36, p < 0.001, g2 = 0.23), and a signiﬁcant
interaction of the two (F[24, 360] = 1.591, p < 0.05,
g2 = 0.10). While a signiﬁcant main effect of gamble pair
on accuracy was still apparent, this effect no longer inter-
acted with session, suggesting that a poor performance in
observational learning of low-value options cannot be ex-
plained by a session order effect. There was, however, a
main effect of session (F[1, 15] = 6.40, p < 0.05, g2 = 0.30),
such that AA participants showed an improved accuracy
from the ﬁrst to the second session (see Fig. S2). Including
a between-subject analysis against the AO participants of
Experiment 1, we found a session  group interaction
(F[1, 30] = 7.28, p < 0.02, g2 = 0.20), and a session  gamble
pair  group interaction (F[3, 90] = 3.68, p < 0.02,
g2 = 0.11), highlighting the speciﬁc impairment in observa-
tional learning for low-value options shown in Experiment
1.
Explicit estimates of p{win} were also more accurate in
both sessions of the AA group. In the AA group, there was a
signiﬁcant main effect of gamble (F[3, 45] = 67.87,p < 0.0001, g2 = 0.82) but the gamble  session interaction
seen in Experiment 1 was no longer evident (see Fig. S3).
When comparing experiments AO and AA, there was a sig-
niﬁcant session  group interaction (F[1, 30] = 7.59,
p < 0.01, g2 = 0.20) and a trend session  gamble  group
interaction (F[3, 90] = 2.70, p = 0.051, g2 = 0.08), showing
that the impaired estimation of the low-value options
was speciﬁc to the observational learning session.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that impaired
learning in the observer session of Experiment 1 cannot
be attributed to a temporal order effect or to the learning
of novel stimuli. The AA group actually showed improved
learning in the second session, perhaps attributable to gen-
eralization of learning strategies, but note this effect did
not interact with gamble pair. This does not preclude the
possibility, however, that a general improvement with task
repetition may interact with the speciﬁc impairment we
ﬁnd in observational learning of low-value options. The
signiﬁcance of such an interaction cannot be determined
in Experiment 1, however, since counterbalancing session
order would have introduced the serious confound that se-
quences of choices would not have been matched between
actor and observer learning.4. Experiment 3
4.1. Participants
Sixteen new participants took part in Experiment 3 (se-
ven female, mean age 21.1 yrs, SD 1.8).4.2. Procedure and analysis
Experiment 3 was designed to distinguish between
over-valuation of low-value options versus over-estima-
tion of low probability events. By reversing the frame we
change the valence and value of the corresponding out-
come, while holding outcome probability constant. Hence,
a 20% probability of a £1 win becomes a 20% probability of
a £1 loss. Subjects overestimate the probability of the 20%
win in Experiment 1, hence if they underestimate the
probability of an 80% loss (i.e. the worst-valued option in
both circumstances), this indicates a value-speciﬁc effect
as distinct from an effect on probability (where we would
expect over-estimation of the likelihood of both 20% win
and loss outcomes). This manipulation in effect presents
matched reward distributions, but translates the average
reward for each from gain to loss.
Experiment 3 utilized the same procedure and tasks
(both actor and observer) as those in Experiment 1, but
with modiﬁed instructions and incentives. Participants
were initially endowed with £10 per session. Instead of
earning money from yellow boxes in the task, participants
were informed that they would lose money from red
boxes. In this way, the punishing power of the red boxes
was assumed to attract more attention than in Experiment
1. At the end of the task, participants provided explicit esti-
mates of the probability of losing (p{loss}) for each stimu-
lus, in place of the p{win} estimates in Experiment 1.
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Experiment 1, between-subject interactions with the ﬁnd-
ings from Experiment 1 were critical. We term Experiment
3’s participants the AO-loss group.4.3. Results and discussion
Within the AO-loss group, we found main effects of ses-
sion (F[1, 15] = 13.36, p < 0.005, g2 = 0.47), gamble pair
(F[3, 45] = 13.98, p < 0.001, g2 = 0.48) and test block
(F[8, 120] = 3.831, p < 0.001, g2 = 0.20), as in the AO group.
We also found an interaction of session  gamble pair
(F[3, 45] = 12.15, p < 0.0001, g2 = 0.45) which was, as in
Experiment 1, driven by observers lower accuracy for the
40/20 p{win} pair compared to actors (t[15] = 5.89,
p < 0.0001) (see Fig. S4). The between-subject effect of
group, i.e. Experiment 1 versus Experiment 3, interacted
only with the main effects of session (F[1, 30] = 4.39,
p < 0.05, g2 = 0.13) and of gamble pair (F[3, 90] = 3.36,
p < 0.05, g2 = 0.10). Therefore, the session  gamble pair
interaction in choice accuracy, seen in Experiment 1, was
replicated but now within the loss domain, with this effect
being driven solely by observers’ impaired accuracy for the
lowest value 40/20 win pair (now 60/80 loss pair).
In the explicit estimates, there was a signiﬁcant main
effect of session (F[1, 15] = 12.86, p < 0.005, g2 = 0.46) and
of gamble (F[3, 45] = 75.85, p < 0.0001, g2 = 0.84), along
with a gamble  session interaction (F[3, 45] = 8.87,
p < 0.0005, g2 = 0.37). Therefore, participants’ explicit esti-
mates of p{loss} for each stimulus also replicated the re-
sults of Experiment 1, supporting an over-valuing of the
lowest value options (i.e. participants underestimated
p{loss} for the 80% loss option) rather than an over-estima-
tion of small probabilities (participants showed high esti-
mation accuracy for options with the lower p{loss}) (see
Fig. S5). However, in the context of this argument, it is
not obvious why the 40% win option was not also over-
valued. One possibility is that the 20% win option may be
qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, of lower value since
it is the only option never paired with an option of an even
lower value. This might explain why we ﬁnd over-valua-
tion only for the 20% win option, but we accept that this
conjecture needs to be tested directly. In Experiment 3,
we also found a slight undervaluation of 80% loss
(t[15] = 2.48, p < 0.05). Observer accuracy when choosing
between the 80/20 win pair also showed a trend to be low-
er than for actors (t[15] = 1.83, p < 0.1). The magnitude of
this effect was much smaller than in the 20/40 condition
and this asymmetrical effect cannot be explained solely
by an error in probability assessment. However, this ﬁnd-
ing hints that both a large over-valuation for low-value op-
tions and also a smaller mis-estimation of low probabilities
may be at play in Experiment 3.5. General discussion
Experiments 1 and 3 both show an over-valuation for
low-value options during observational learning, an effect
evident across implicit (i.e. choice preference) and explicit
indices of subjective value. This difference was evident de-spite the observational and operant learning tasks being
matched for visual information, and for monetary incen-
tives to learn. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows that learn-
ing is generally improved between two active learning
sessions despite the time delay and the novel stimuli being
learned. Experiment 3 also suggests that the deﬁcit in
observational learning is particularly in valuation of low-
value options, rather than an imprecision when estimating
low probabilities, indicating that observers are biased to
(inappropriately) discount the chance they will experience
the negative outcomes seen to be incurred by others. These
results are intriguing since neither social learning theories
nor reinforcement learning approaches explicitly predict
that action-outcome contingency learning should depend
upon the manner through which they are learnt. Also
recent neuroimaging studies in humans report neuronal
responses to errors (Koelewijn, van Schie, Bekkering,
Oostenveld, & Jensen, 2008; van Schie, Mars, Coles, &
Bekkering, 2004; Yu & Zhou, 2006) and successes (Mobbs
et al., 2009) observed from the behavior of others, compa-
rable to those seen in response to self-experienced out-
comes, meaning one might predict little difference in
learning from such responses. Yu and colleagues report
feedback-related negativities (FRN) that are smaller in
magnitude, more posteriorly located in the brain and have
a smaller impact on future behavior in observation com-
pared to action, consistent with the learning differences
we ﬁnd (Yu & Zhou, 2006). While they suggest that these
differences may be related to decreased motivation and
emotional involvement in the outcome during observation,
to our knowledge our present data are the ﬁrst to indicate
that observational learning may be suboptimal in the con-
text of low-value options.
The learning deﬁcit shown by observers is equivalent to
a behavioral manifestation of an optimistic bias, reﬂecting
a tendency to underweight the prospect of a negative
experience. Optimism often has a socially comparative nat-
ure as when we tend to overestimate our own strengths
and resources, while discounting those of others (Radcliffe
& Klein, 2002). This bias is likely to be associated with the
protection of self-esteem and avoidance of social anxiety
(e.g. Hirsch & Mathews, 2000), coupled with a desire to
be better than others (Weinstein, 1989). Highly optimistic
individuals are known to retain less information on per-
sonal risk factors and also show more initial avoidance of
such information, while those with lower optimism were
more realistic and more open to receiving risk information
(Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). We show that observers over-
value options that they have seen resulting in losses for
others, reﬂecting a similarly optimistic judgment of per-
sonal risk. It is important to note that, with our task design,
we cannot determine whether the over-valuation of low-
value options is of a socially comparative rather than of a
non-social nature. This remains a critical point to address
in future studies, using experimental designs aimed at
teasing apart these two possible underlying inﬂuences.
In contrast to our ﬁndings, Braver and Rohrer (1978)
found that observers learnt appropriate (i.e. reinforced) re-
sponses better than did actors (participants) in the context
of interpersonal conﬂict resolution in a prisoner’s dilemma
game. They proposed that the difference may be due to an
A. Nicolle et al. / Cognition 119 (2011) 394–402 401actor’s reluctance to modify their behavior in response to
their failures, instead attributing responsibility for the fail-
ure externally (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). However, it has also
been suggested that egocentrism (i.e. internal focus of
attention, and failure to carefully consider the circum-
stances of others) encourages a particular tendency to feel
that one is less likely to experience the negative events
experienced by others (Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982),
known as comparative optimism. There is a recognized
tendency for individuals to show an external attribution
for failures and an internal attribution for successes, a bias
that might interfere with accurate learning of action-out-
come contingencies. Speciﬁcally, such an attribution bias
distorts observational learning through a tendency to attri-
bute an observed actor’s failures to internally (i.e. disposi-
tional) causes, encouraging an observer to believe they are
less likely to fail or lose themselves. On the other hand, the
actor’s successes are perceived as externally determined,
easily obtainable, and not due to any exceptional skill in
the actor.
While these optimistic biases, whether social or non-
social, can lead to a selective encoding of positive informa-
tion, and underweighting of negative outcomes, learning
through direct experiment can lead to increased realism
in estimating risk (Burger & Palmer, 1992; Helweg-Larsen,
1999; Van der Velde, Van der Pligt, & Hooykaas, 1994;
Weinstein, 1987, 1989). This may reﬂect the greater vivid-
ness and self-relevance of direct experience (Helweg-Lar-
sen, 1999; Stapel & Velthuijsen, 1996) or reﬂect
improved recall of one’s own actions (Weinstein, 1987,
see also Tversky & Kahneman’s availability heuristic,
1974). Such an interpretation accords with ﬁndings that
directly experienced information is given greater weight
than observed information in guiding future behavior in
social games, even if both are equally informative and
equally attended (Simonsohn, Karlsson, Loewenstein, &
Ariely, 2008).
An alternative explanation to account for the disparity
between observational and operant learning might be
that learning about low-value options is simply more dif-
ﬁcult, a difﬁculty ampliﬁed by the relatively greater
declarative demands of observational learning. However,
the success rate for observer learning of the 20% win op-
tion did not increase at all over the nine test blocks, sug-
gesting that learning was not simply slower in observers.
Another possibility is that the effect could be explained
by differences in sampling between operant and observa-
tional learning. While sampling errors have been impli-
cated in biased probability weightings, such results
show a tendency to overweight high probability gains
when learning through experience (e.g. Hertwig, Barron,
Weber, & Erev, 2004), in contrast to our ﬁnding of over-
weighting low probability gains. Moreover, a difﬁculty
for a sampling difference explanation is the fact that full
and identical feedback, of chosen and unchosen gamble
outcomes, was presented to both actors and observers.
However, sampling errors may occur at the level of
attention rather than choice, where certain outcomes
may be deemed to hold more personal relevance than
others. The active nature of operant learning could alsoengage the actor and improve efﬁciency of learning
(Cohn et al., 1994), although this would be predicted to
occur across the full range of probabilities.
In this article, we demonstrate a difference in value
learning between acting and observation, an effect not
previously reported to the best of our knowledge. These
ﬁndings have important implications for how we apply
learning theory to vicarious learning, either social or
non-social, as classical models assign no differences to
these alternative models of learning. This bias in learning
indicates that action-outcome contingency learning de-
pends on the manner through which it is learned, and
indicates that actors and observers implement different
weightings for positive and negative experiences as they
sample outcomes. As we are interested in the mecha-
nisms underlying this effect, we excluded two important
alternative explanations. In Experiment 2 we rule out a
value-speciﬁc order effect on learning, while in Experi-
ment 3 we show that this effect is driven by poor esti-
mation of value rather than of probability. This leaves
open a possibility that the effect reﬂects an optimistic
bias in observational learning leading one to underesti-
mate the likelihood of experiencing negative events, as
observed occurring to others, a bias not present in actors
learning by direct experience as in trial-and-error. To
provide a more precise account we believe requires addi-
tional experimentation. In particular, the fact that the ef-
fect is speciﬁc to the lowest value option of the choice
set (i.e. only the 20% win option) could indicate that this
over-valuation is a non-linear effect of value learning
present over-and-above a certain threshold. This non-
linear effect may also be explained by a critical role of con-
text in value learning, whereby observers’ over-valuation is
only for options that are of low value relative to either the
whole choice set (i.e. 20% win options were the lowest va-
lue in the choice set) or to the alternative option in the pair
(i.e. 20% win options were the only option never paired
with an option of an even lower value). Indeed such refer-
ence dependent effects on subjective representations of
value are supported by an extensive psychological (e.g.
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mellers, 2000) and neurosci-
ence literature (e.g. Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, &
Shizgal, 2001; Elliott, Agnew, & Deakin, 2008; Tremblay &
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